We develop and test a model of the patenting and R&D decisions of an innovating firm whose researcher-employees sometime quit to join or start a rival. In our model, the innovating firm patents to protect itself from its workers. We show theoretically that the risk of a scientist's departure raises the firm's propensity to patent an innovation and reduces its research expenditures, which is confirmed in our empirical study of firm-level panel data. Our results suggest that the scientists' turnover partly explains cross-industry patenting variation, recent increases in patenting, and why small firms have high patent-R&D ratios.
Introduction
Since the mid-1900s firms have acquired many of the innovations for new products and manufacturing processes through their own research and development efforts, rather than through licensing agreements with independent scientists. Internalizing the R&D enterprise has advantages over acquiring the innovations through arm's-length transactions because of the complementarities between the research conducted and the firm's production function knowledge about the production function is costly to transmit to outsidersand because of the difficulty of motivating contractors (see Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999) . But innovating inhouse creates a challenge: firms face the risk of their scientists, researchers, and other key personnel leaving after a discovery to exploit the discovery on their own. One way that they can mitigate this risk is by patenting innovations as they are developed in the laboratory. In this paper we examine theoretically and empirically how the threat of a scientist leaving affects the firms' patenting and R&D decisions.
Through patenting, an innovating firm can prevent competitors from imitating new products and thus can preserve its market share. Secrecy offers the firm an alternative means of securing the returns to R&D while avoiding both the steep legal expenses of patent application and infringement prosecution, and the losses to competitors from disclosing sensitive information (Friedman, Landes and Posner, 1991; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) . At the time patents are granted, the USPTO publishes the detailed technical information that firms have submitted in support of their patent application. Rival firms may be able to use this information to innovate around the patent. Nevertheless, resorting to secrecy is also risky. An innovating firm's rivals may gain access to its secrets through reverse engineering, espionage, and especially former employees.
Technological know-how acquired through research experience is embedded in the scientist's human capital. This knowledge becomes available to a competitor when the employee switches jobs. Economists have long suspected that the inter-firm mobility of scientists transmits technological know-how across firms (Arrow, 1962; Stephan, 1996) , but evidence is often anecdotal and econometric evidence is scarce. Levin, Klevoric, Nelson, and Winter (1987) present survey evidence that firms count the hiring of R&D employees from innovating firms as a means of learning about new technologies. Almeida and Kogut (1999) find that skilled engineers who hold major semiconductor patents experience high rates of inter-firm mobility.
They find that this mobility influences the scientific references that firms cite in their patent applications, suggesting that ideas in the semiconductor industry are spread by the movement of key engineers among firms, especially within a geographical region. Articles in the business press suggest high tech firms actively encourage defections among competitors' technological personnel. Kerstetter (2000) and Hibbard (1998) provide several high profile examples of employee raids designed to gain access to competitors' technologies, supporting Kerstetter's claim that Silicon Valley firms live by the philosophy, "If you have trouble with the competition, simply raid its talent." Recently documented increases in scientists and engineers' inter-firm mobility (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000 1 ) suggest that employee misappropriation of technological know-how may be on the rise, especially among high-tech firms.
Trade secret laws and non-compete covenants in employment contracts, which provide that a leaving employee will not seek employment with the employer's competitor or found a competing start-up company, do not appear to limit the risk of this kind of misappropriation (see Bongiorno and Marcellino, 1996; Jenero and Schreiber, 1999) . Courts are reluctant to enforce such covenants because of the restrictions they place on the worker's ability to secure employment (see Dworkin and Callahan, 1998; Gilson, 1999; Koh, 1998) . 2 Thus, firms and employees cannot easily contract around the misappropriation problem.
The economics literature typically frames the patent as a device to exclude outsiders. In this paper, we emphasize a patent's role in protecting an innovating firm from insiders. We hypothesize that a firm that risks losing innovations to departing scientists will move quickly to patent its scientists' innovations. As the likelihood of a quit rises, so should the utility of patent protection. Increases in scientists' mobility may therefore induce firms to substitute away from secrecy toward patenting, leading to an increase in firms' propensities to patent per R&D dollar spent. As an increase in the potential external return to the acquired knowledge entices them to leave innovating firms, scientists become willing to take a salary cut, reducing the wage bill and thus the R&D expense for innovating firms. This is the main story we investigate in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a formal model of a firm's R&D and patenting decision in an environment where scientist-employees turn over. Sections 3 and 4,  respectively, explain our empirical strategy and describe the data. Section 5 describes our results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and includes a discussion of the importance of the mobility of scientific personnel in explaining observed cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in patenting and in explaining variation in patent-R&D ratio by firm size.
Model of firm's patenting and R&D response to scientist mobility
We formalize our ideas along the lines of Pakes and Nitzan (1983) , who study how innovating firms contract with their scientific personnel when scientists may leave to set up rivals. We build on their model by allowing a firm to patent its innovations before the scientist leaves. We start with an entrepreneur who wishes to develop an idea into a marketable product. 4 The entrepreneur seeks to hire a scientist to develop the idea. The scientist is the only additional input in the development process. When a scientist is hired, the project's development, production, and marketing take two periods. In the first period, the scientist develops the idea into a viable prototype. In the second period, the entrepreneur produces and markets the product, without the aid of the scientist. We assume that the product's life on the market ends at the end of the second period and that the present value of the expected revenue at the first period, ρ, is known beforehand. By the end of the first period, the scientist possesses knowledge that enables him, if he desires, to market the innovation himself. At the beginning of the second period the entrepreneur and the scientist learn about the value of this knowledge to a rival. We assume that this external value is a random variable, θ (∈R), with c.d.f., F, known to the entrepreneur and the scientist. θ is the external value of the innovation net of moving costs, which include the set-up cost in the event the scientist establishes a start-up, or the search cost of finding a suitable rival firm otherwise, and any relocation expenses. If the scientist finds the external value of the innovation sufficiently attractive, he sets up or joins a rival. The entrepreneur and the rival then proceed to market slightly different but highly substitutable products, both with a single period product cycle. The appearance on the market of the rival's product reduces the entrepreneur's revenue by λρ, where λ ∈ [0,1]. The rival may also use this knowledge to develop an unrelated line of products. Thus θ reflects the expected value of any spillovers, in addition to the expected revenue of the substitutable good. Alternatively, if the scientist chooses to stay, the entrepreneur markets the product alone. At the beginning of the second period, the entrepreneur decides whether to patent the product, taking into account the effect of patenting on the scientist's decision to leave. Should the scientist leave, we assume the patent reduces the entrepreneur's loss from the scientist's appropriation to (1-δ)λρ, δ ∈ [0,1], and the revenues that the rival obtains from the substitutable good by γρ, γ ∈ [0,1]. We denote the patent's out-of-pocket costs and the costs from information disclosure as ν.
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We assume that the scientist like the entrepreneur is risk neutral and therefore maximizes his expected income. The scientist chooses at the beginning of the first period whether to accept the entrepreneur's offer or to work for another firm outside the R&D sector. To simplify the analysis we assume that outside the R&D sector he would acquire no appropriable proprietary knowledge but would receive his marginal product, w , in the first period. In the second period he earns w* if he stays at the same non-R&D firm, or w if he moves. We assume that w* > w since the scientist accumulates firm specific human capital. The entrepreneur's offer consists of a guaranteed first period wage, w0, and a second period bonus, w1, when the scientist remains in the second period. The entrepreneur specifies the bonus only after θ is realized but declares up front the rule that she will use to determine the bonus. If the scientist accepts the job offer in the first period, at the beginning of the second period he chooses among three options based on the realized θ. He may remain with the entrepreneur, earning w1 and performing work equal in value to w*. He may set up or join a rival, performing work equal in value to w , and, in addition, marketing the entrepreneur's knowledge and receiving its full value, θ (or θ−γρ, if the entrepreneur has patented). Finally, he may move to the non-R&D sector where he earns w .
The entrepreneur's objective is to maximize expected profits from the project. The expected profit from hiring a scientist is:
where the indicator p is 1 if the entrepreneur patents and zero otherwise, S is the set of θ such that the scientist stays, and M is the set of θ such that the scientist moves to a rival. We define N as the remaining set of θ such that the scientist moves to the non-R&D sector. Moving to the non-R&D sector has no effect on the entrepreneur's expected profit. Note that the wage in the second period w1 depends on the value of θ and the entrepreneur's patenting decision. The entrepreneur hires the scientist if the expected profit is positive. The scientist accepts the contract in the first period if the expected earnings in two periods exceed w + w*: (2) w + w* ≤ w0 + ( )
We ignore discounting for simplicity. The entrepreneur's problem is to choose p, w0, and w1 to maximize (1) subject to the scientist's participation constraint, (2) . The following derivation of the optimal patent and wage policy assumes a time-consistent Nash equilibrium in which the entrepreneur and the scientist take the other party's decision in the second period as given.
In this Nash bargaining framework, the scientist correctly anticipates that if he accepts the compensation package offer of w0, and w1, when the second period arrives, the entrepreneur will offer the bonus that maximizes her second period net earnings. The entrepreneur sets w0 so that the scientist's expected value of the contract equals his reservation earnings in two periods, w + w*. Thus, to derive the firm's patent and wage policy, we first derive for each realized θ the w1 and p that maximize the entrepreneur's second period net revenue. We then substitute the optimal second period policy into (2) to form the scientist's expected second period payoff and solve for w0. In this derivation, we assume that the entrepreneur's gain from patenting exceeds the rival's loss, i.e. δλρ > γρ. This assumption is not crucial to the model and our main implications still hold under the alternative assumption. 4 For any draw of θ at the beginning of the second period, one can easily show that from the scientist's perspective moving to the non-R&D sector is always dominated by both staying and moving to a rival as long as w* > w . Thus, the only issue to resolve is whether the scientist stays or moves to a rival firm. We first suppose θ > θ1 ≡ λρ + (w*− w ). The scientist's gain from establishing or joining a rival exceeds the firm's loss (= λρ − δλρ + w*), whether the firm patents or not. Thus, the scientist leaves the entrepreneur for the rival and earns θ − γρ + w if the entrepreneur patents, and θ + w otherwise. She patents only if the gain to patenting exceeds its cost, i.e. ν ≤ δλρ. The entrepreneur's wage and patent policies in this and the other cases discussed below are depicted in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows the scientist's mobility and entrepreneur's patenting and wage decisions in each region of θ-ν space.
Suppose, instead, θ2 ≡ λρ + (w*− w ) − (δλρ−γρ) < θ ≤ θ1. In the absence of patenting, the establishment of a rival would cost the entrepreneur more than it would benefit the scientist.
In this case, the entrepreneur offers the scientist w1 = θ + w , the smallest wage that the scientist would accept to stay. In this range of θ, patenting causes the benefit to the scientist from leaving to exceed its cost to the entrepreneur. Thus, when the entrepreneur patents the innovation, the scientist leaves to form a rival. The entrepreneur patents if her second period earnings after patenting are greater than they would be otherwise. That is, the entrepreneur patents if ν ≤ θ − (w*− w ) -(1−δ)λρ. This threshold between patenting and non-patenting is illustrated in Figure   1 as the line in the range θ2 < θ ≤ θ1.
Consider now the entrepreneur's optimal strategy when γρ < θ ≤ θ2. In this case, θ is low enough that whether the firm patents or not, the loss to the entrepreneur if the scientist sets up a rival exceeds the scientist's gain. Thus, the entrepreneur always offers the scientist the minimum w1 to induce him to stay: θ + w if she does not patent, and θ − γρ + w otherwise. By reducing the return to the scientist in his best alternative employment, patenting reduces the wage offer necessary to retain him. Thus, the entrepreneur patents only if ν ≤ γρ. θ may also fall between 0 and γρ . If the entrepreneur chooses not to patent, the gain to the scientist in forming a rival would exceed the loss to the entrepreneur. Thus, if she does not patent she would offer a wage equal to θ+ w to retain the scientist. If she were to patent and if the scientist were to leave, he would choose not to exploit his knowledge since marketing a similar product would earn him θ − γρ < 0. By patenting, she reduces the wage necessary to retain the scientist by θ, and thus patents only if ν ≤ θ. If she patents, she offers the scientist w to stay and earns w*− w from the scientist's services.
Finally, suppose θ < 0. In this case, the entrepreneur does not patent, and offers w to the scientist, who stays in the second period and produces w*.
Substituting the optimal second period wage, patent, and mobility choices, into the participation constraint (2) yields
where w0 equates the scientist's expected payoff from accepting the entrepreneur's offer and his reservation earnings. 5 Substituting the above equation for w0 gives us the following expression for the expected profit:
This equation shows the cost and benefit of patenting. The last term on the right hand side of (1′) reflects the cost of patenting, which the entrepreneur bears both when the scientist stays and moves to a rival. The fifth term shows that patenting benefits the entrepreneur only when the scientist moves to a rival, and then, only to the extent that δλρ−γρ. The benefit from patenting is less than δλρ because any reduction in the scientist's expected gain from moving is anticipated by the scientist in the first period, and therefore must be added to the scientist's first period wage.
The expected profit does not show a benefit for patenting when the scientist stays because the patent's benefit to the entrepreneurthe reduction in w1 by γρrepresents an equivalent loss to the scientist, and thus must be added to the scientist's first period wage offer. Thus, patenting in the event that the scientist stays in the second period lowers her total profits, owing to the patenting cost ν. By allowing the entrepreneur to credibly commit to patenting only when the scientist leaves, the entrepreneur will choose to patent only when the scientist leaves, thus increasing her expected profit by ∫ =1 In our model, any exogenous change in the distribution of θ can affect the entrepreneur's and the scientist's decisions. To simplify the analysis, assume that the random variable θ is equal to θ + ε, where ε (∈R) is a mean zero random variable with distribution G, and θ , a constant, is the mean of θ. The following proposition describes the effect of a change in the mobility of scientists in our model. Proposition 1. An increase in the mean of θ , θ , increases the probability of a scientist moving to a rival. An increase in θ also increases the entrepreneur's propensity to patent an innovation. Figure 2 show the boundaries of Figure 1 redrawn in ν-ε space.
The boundaries in bold in
This transformation shifts the boundaries of Figure 1 leftward by θ . The dashed boundaries in Figure 2 result from an increase in θ . A scientist's likelihood of moving rises with the return to moving, and an increase in θ means that the scientist will depart for lower draws of ε than before, shown as the expanding area of mobility in Figure 2 (Regions A, B, and C). The increase in the return to moving raises the likelihood that the entrepreneur patents the innovation and Regions B and D in Figure 2 illustrate her response. Region B reflects an increase in patenting as she attempts to reduce the revenue loss from the departing scientist passing on his knowledge to rivals. The increased patenting Region D represents arises even though the entrepreneur knows the scientist will stay. The entrepreneur patents more often to lower the scientist's second period reservation wage, which has risen with θ .
The expected R&D expenditures for a research project, excluding the patenting cost, are as follows,
The effect of an increase in θ on the R&D expenditures is analyzed in Proposition 2. 
In the same way, we can show that
when γρ < ν ≤ δλρ, and
, and g is the density of ε. ■ A rightward shift in the distribution of θ, and therefore an increase in the mobility of a scientist, implies that the entrepreneur will be better able to exploit the gains to leaving, reducing the wage she has to pay the scientist. In other words, the scientist is willing to accept a lower wage when the prospects from leaving improve, which reduces the expected R&D expenditures.
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The effect of an increase in θ on the profitability of a research project is ambiguous however. When γρ < ν ≤ δλρ, differentiating the expected profit with respect to θ yields
The first term on the right hand side of the equation is positive, reflecting the reduction in the scientist's wage following the improvement in his return from moving.
8 This effect is opposed by the increase in the entrepreneur's patenting expenses that follow from the increased mobility caused by the rise in θ . This effect is shown in the second term on the right hand side. γρ is the profit reduction when the entrepreneur switches from a no-patenting to a patenting policy and the scientist goes from staying to moving.
is the probability of the policy switch (see Region B
in Figure 2 ). In the case where ν ≤ γρ, these opposing effects remain and thus the effect of the θ on profitability is again ambiguous. If ν > δλρ, we can show that an increase in θ unambiguously raises the expected profit for the entrepreneur since the wage paid to a scientist is made lower without any additional increase in patenting cost.
If the increase in the returns to moving improves the profitability of research, firms will pursue more research projects and more patents will result. On top of this increase in patents at the extensive margin, the probability of patenting in a given research project rises as θ increases, which gives us an unambiguous prediction of the effect of mobility. But in this case, the effect on the R&D expenditure will be ambiguous. On the other hand, if the profitability of research falls as θ increases, an increase in θ will have an adverse impact on R&D expenditures while the effect on patenting is ambiguous.
If the entrepreneur's commitment to a labor contract can be enforced without cost in the second period (e.g., through reputation), the equilibrium wage and patent policy will be different from those in the Nash equilibrium since the entrepreneur and the scientist can achieve a Pareto improvement by avoiding unnecessary patenting and its attendant costs. One can show that in the commitment equilibrium, the firm patents less frequently (the proof is sketched in Appendix I), and that propositions 1 and 2 hold.
Empirical strategy
Our research exploits the panel nature of a unique data set that matches the firm-level
Standard & Poor's Compustat data to the USPTO data on patents. We combine these data with estimates of researchers' inter-firm job mobility from the Current Population Survey. We discuss our data sources in the following section. As our starting point, we consider the effect of the mobility of scientists on the firm's patenting decision, following the Poisson-based econometric specification of Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) , and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) .
We favor a Poisson-based specification because the number of patents granted to a firm in a particular year is a count variable, often taking the value of zero or one. We assume that the expected number of patents granted to a firm, conditional on its characteristics, is
where Pft is the number of patents granted to firm f that were applied for in year t, Xft is a 1xK 13 vector of firm f's characteristics in year t, and Mft measures the level of job mobility among scientists and engineers working for firm f in period t. Properly measured, the variation in Mft reflects variation in exogenous determinants of mobility, such as changes in the external net value of innovation θ in our model. We discuss its construction in the following section.
Following Hall and Ziedonis, Xft includes the logarithms of sales (LnSALES), as a measure of the size of the firm, to account for scale economies in producing patents, and the capital-labor ratio (LnK/L), measured as the deflated plant and equipment over the number of employees.
9 A patent infringement suit that leads to court injunction and production stoppage will be more destructive for a firm that has made a large capital investment in a state-of-the-art physical plant.
Such vulnerability may encourage the firm to develop a diverse portfolio of patents that it can use as a bargaining chip to ward off infringement suits (Cohen et al., 2000; Parr and Sullivan, 1996) . On the other hand, the firm may be discouraged from engaging in R&D at the first place, which will reduce patenting. Thus, we cannot anticipate the direction of the effect of K/L on patents granted. Unlike previous specifications in the literature, our reduced-form specification omits R&D expenditures on the right hand side because our theoretical model indicates that R&D expenditures are endogenous. Nevertheless, to establish a link to this literature and as a check of the methods and data we are using, we estimate the model in (4) with R&D expenditures as an additional regressor.
We will obtain estimates of β and ζ, using maximum likelihood estimation techniques for the Poisson distribution. The firm-specific constant term αf is estimated by a random-effects model where the random effects are distributed gamma.
A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of the patent-mobility relationship allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of our measure of mobility. Recall that the model says that while changes in mobility may lead firms to patent more often, by patenting more often a firm may induce some of its scientists to move. Our model thus predicts that higher patenting leads to more mobility. This direction of causality should be more important the more narrowly we define the firm's labor market. In the limiting case, where we define the firm's labor market as the pool of worker's working at the firm, the endogeneity of the mobility estimate is obvious.
Here we follow Windmeijer (2000) and Wooldridge (1991 In our empirical work the lags and the instruments we use produce more moment conditions than the number of parameters we wish to estimate. Our estimates of the parameters minimize a quadratic function formed by the weighted sample moment conditions corresponding to (6) and (7) (Griliches, 1990) . The error term is assumed the sum of a random firm effect, φf, and a noise term ft u , assumed distributed i.i.d.
normal with zero mean.
To account for the endogeneity of ft M in the R&D regressions, we employ a two stage least squares estimation procedure as described in Greene (2000) , which simultaneously corrects for serially correlated errors (see section 5.2 for details).
Data description
Our labor mobility data for scientists and engineers are taken from the Annual Our basic measure of job mobility is the share of scientists and engineers in each industry and year who changed their employers at least once within the previous year. We call this measure the employer change rate (ECR). 11 We compute separate measures by industry because we presume that the likelihood of a scientist leaving is mainly imposed on a firm by conditions in the firm's industry, and that industry-specific capital means scientists are significantly more likely to stay in the same industry when they change firms. 12 Regardless of how broadly we define the labor market in constructing our mobility measure, we may face a problem of reverse causality, that is, from patents or R&D expenditures to mobility. To minimize the problem, we treat our mobility measure as endogenous in all of our empirical specifications.
The second measure consists of job mobility for scientists and engineers by geographical region and year (GEO). For many scientists and engineers movement occurs within geographically defined markets, i.e., they may seek employment opportunities only within the region that they live. In this case, the job turnover facing a firm will be strongly related to labor mobility within its geographical area. and employ high levels of plants and equipment relative to labor. Note that in the Poisson specification the estimated coefficients for the log-transformed regressors have an elasticity interpretation. The logarithm of the mean age of scientists and engineers in each industry by year (LnAGE_ECR) or in each region by year (LnAGE_GEO) is introduced as a regressor because of the link between age and turnover (see, for example, Hall, 1982) . Inter-firm mobility is much higher among the young, who also have fewer skills and are less productive. By adding age, we partly control for the changing distribution of skills in the labor force that may accompany changes in the mobility, and thus we more precisely isolate the effect of mobility on patents.
Results

Mobility and Patenting
In Panel 1, we find a positive and significant coefficient estimate on LnECR. This is consistent with two possibilities: First, mobility raises the profitability of research projects and hence increases patents at the extensive margin. Second, if it lowers the profitability of the project, the decline in patents from the fall in the number of projectsor the extensive marginis more than offset by the rise in patents per projector the intensive margin. That is, if an increase in mobility causes R&D projects to be less profitable, the evidence implies that the intensive margin dominates the extensive margin.
Not surprisingly, LnSALES has a strong positive effect on patents in this regression, as well as in the other regressions in Table 2 The models estimated for Panel 4-6 use the geographical measures for mobility (GEO) and age (AGE_GEO) in specifications that are otherwise identical to the models for Panel 1-3, respectively.
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The geographical mobility measure in Panels 4-6 exhibits a pronounced, statistically significant, positive effect on patents. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates on GEO generally imply a larger elasticity than the estimates produced using ECR. One possible reason may be a more adverse effect of the mobility within the same industry, captured by ECR, on profits from research projects, which lowers the R&D expenditures and hence patents at the extensive margin.
The finding on the effect of geographical mobility has an implication for the literature on spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) report that in their patent applications, firms often cite the work of external scientists, but that these scientists tend to work locally.
Their findings suggest that geographical proximity is necessary for a technological spillover to take place. Our finding that geographical mobility has a strong effect on patenting suggests that the movement of researchers among firms (and between academia and firms) may be an important mechanism for the transmission of these spillovers.
In addition to the random effects specifications, we estimated fixed-effects Poisson models (results not shown), which show qualitatively and quantitatively similar impacts of labor mobility on patenting. We also tested the sensitivity of our estimates to the distributional assumption for the random effect. The estimated effect of mobility was as pronounced whether we assumed its distribution normal or gamma. Table 2b are identical to the specifications in Panels 1-6 of Table 2a . We chose the logarithms of the fractions of scientists who are white (LnWHITE) and who are male (LnMALE) as instruments for mobility in all panels of the table because of the well-known finding in the empirical literature that non-whites and women have higher rates of turnover (see Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981) . 20 In Panels 2 and 5,
we also treat the R&D expenditures as an endogenous variable with the mean age of scientists as an additional instrumental variable (see footnote 17).
Like the Poisson estimation, the GMM estimation generates statistically significant and positive estimates of the effect of labor mobility on patenting, despite the much smaller sample size. In all specifications with the industry measure of mobility, the coefficient estimates on mobility are quantitatively very similar to those from the Poisson estimation. The estimated effect of geographical mobility on patenting remains statistically significant, but in the last two panels, it is considerably larger than in the corresponding Poisson models. The estimate of the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D spending is now similar to the estimate obtained by
Hall and Ziedonis. Table 2b also reports the results of the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. Each of the six specifications passes this test. Table 3 shows the results from our estimation of the determinants of the firm's R&D expenditure decision. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real R&D expenditures in 1982-84 dollars (LnR&D). Panel 1 in Table 3 shows the results of our estimation of a randomeffects general least squares model with LnECR, LnSALES, and LnK/L included as regressors.
Mobility and R&D
This panel shows a negative and statistically significant effect of ECR on R&D expenditures. A Hausman endogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the mobility measure ECR, however. Also the test for serially correlated errors in a least squares regression indicates a serially correlated error term. To account for the endogeneity of ECR, in Panel 2 we employ a 2SLS estimation procedure as described in Greene (2000) , which simultaneously corrects for serially correlated errors. 21 The coefficient estimate on ECR from the 2SLS regression remains negative and significant, but smaller in magnitude. The smaller magnitude of the estimate is consistent with a story of reverse causality in which firms that pay higher wages to scientists, and thus report higher R&D expenditures, enjoy lower turnover. The inverse relationship between wages and turnover is well documented in the labor economics literature (see Parsons, 1977) . 22 Panel 3 uses the same 2SLS method but with a time trend on the right hand side. With the time trend, the estimated effect of LnECR is still significantly negative.
The specifications in Panels 4 and 5 are identical to those in Panels 2 and 3, respectively, except that the geographical mobility (GEO) and age (AGE_GEO) are used in place of the industry-specific mobility (ECR) and age (AGE_ECR). We find that the effect of GEO on R&D expenditures is insignificant even though it is still negative. There are at least two possible reasons for this. First, the R&D expenditures in Compustat include the amount of R&D performed by a firm in both its domestic and international operations (see Hall and Long, 1999) .
In the face of increasing mobility in its domestic labor market, a firm might shift some of its R&D activity abroad, which will wash out the effect of GEO on R&D. Note that the shift of R&D activity abroad is not expected to weaken the effect of GEO on patents because firms ultimately try to patent in the U.S. Second, if ECR's adverse effect on profits were greater than GEO's effectas explained in the previous sectionthen we would expect the impact of GEO on R&D would be smaller, due to its smaller impact at the extensive margin.
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The estimated coefficients on sales and the capital-labor ratio are positive and significant in all panels. The inferences reported in Table 3 did not change qualitatively when fixed effects models were run instead of random effects models.
Our finding that an increase in the mobility of scientists lowers R&D expenditures and raises patenting is consistent with the following two stories. The first story is that mobility has increased the profitability of R&D projects. In this case, both the intensive and extensive margins work in the same direction to increase patenting. However, for R&D expenditures to decrease, the intensive margin must dominate the extensive margin, because for R&D, the two margins work in opposite directions. The second story is that rising mobility decreases the profitability of R&D projects. Under this scenario, the intensive and extensive margins work in the same direction to lower the entrepreneur's R&D investment. However, for patenting to rise, the intensive margin must dominate the extensive margin. Whether increasing mobility increases or decreases the profitability of research projects, the intensive marginstudied extensively in the theoretical sectionis the key to explaining our results.
Concluding remarks
In the first half of the paper, we developed a model for understanding the effect of the threat of a scientist's technology transfer to a rival on his employer's R&D and patenting decisions. In our model, while working in the employer's laboratory scientists develop technical knowledge that in later periods they can exploit at a rival firm. Because this technological knowledge has value with other employers, it is general human capital for which the scientist is willing to pay. Like Pakes and Nitzan, we show that when the return to leaving rises, the wages a firm pays for the scientist's services drop, and so do the R&D expenditures. We also show that when patenting reduces the firm's loss when the scientist leaves or his wage when he stays by more than the patenting cost, the firm patents. Theoretically, at the project level this leads to a positive relationship between mobility and patenting, and a negative relationship between mobility and R&D expenditures.
At the firm level, however, the effects of mobility on patenting and R&D expenditures depend on how mobility affects the profitability of R&D projects. We show that only for sufficiently low patenting expenses does the increase in the returns to moving increase the profitability of research projects. This implies that for sufficiently low patenting expenses an increase in mobility increases patenting but has an ambiguous effect on R&D expenditures at the firm level. When patent expenses are sufficiently high, the increase in returns to moving reduces R&D expenditures and has an ambiguous effect on patenting.
Our regression results show that a firm's patenting and mobility rates for scientists and engineers are positively correlated, consistent with our hypothesis that firms use patenting to minimize the harm caused by departing scientists. We also find that the mobility rates are negatively correlated with firm-level research and development outlays. These results support our story that as the expected gain to departing scientists improves, and the risk of separation increases, an innovating firm pays less for scientists and therefore less for its R&D activities.
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Furthermore, our findings constitute rare (indirect) econometric evidence that technological innovations are passed among firms by mobile research personnel. Our findings are based on estimates that take into account the potential endogeneity of our labor mobility measures. In the R&D regressions, we also account for serial correlation in the panel's error terms.
Our results are not only statistically significant, but economically significant as well. The average number of patents per real R&D dollar in our data varies by industry and region. The mean patent-R&D ratiowhere R&D is measured in millions of 1982-84 dollarsranges from 0.62 to 3.13 across the 15 industries we study, and from 1.29 to 4.54 across the 9 geographical regions. Our empirical estimates suggest that a reduction in the industry-specific measure of mobility (ECR) by one half would lower a typical firm's patent-R&D ratio by 3 percent; a reduction in the geographic-specific measure of mobility (GEO) by one half would lower this ratio by 9 percent. 25 Moreover, our estimation results can explain some of the increase in the patent-R&D ratio since the mid-1980s (see Kortum and Lerner, 1998 Our results may help explain the substantial variation that we observe in patent-R&D ratios across firms of different size. Griliches (1990) attributes the higher patent-R&D ratios in small firms to selection bias and the differential role of formal R&D for small and large firms.
Our data show researchers working in firms whose employment levels range from 0 to 499, from 500 to 999, and above 1000 have employer change rates of 0.20, 0.16, and 0.11, respectively. 28 This is consistent with the finding in the labor literature that the job turnover rate is significantly higher among workers in small firms (see Oi, 1983) . Our data show that the patent-R&D ratio of the smallest group divided by the ratio of the largest group is 0.433/0.371 = 1.17. Of this 17 percent difference between the patent-R&D ratios of small versus large firms, our estimates can explain 3 to 8 points, or 18 to 47 percent.
29
While the empirical results support the implications of our theoretical model, we have not addressed a number of issues behind the increase in mobility. For instance, we have not dealt with the effect of labor mobility on the organization of R&D activities in firms. Nor have we investigated more fundamental forces behind the labor mobility change of scientists such as changes in R&D spillovers and other labor market factors. We leave these issues to future work. Note: The z columns report the ratios of coefficient to its standard error. The random effects follow a gamma distribution. The last row reports a Wald chisquare statistic for testing the specification in the column. Note: The z columns report the ratios of coefficient to its standard error. Model (1) uses the random effects GLS method. The 2SLS method with autocorrelation correction (Greene) is applied to Models (2) - (5) . See the text for the detailed procedure. The AR(1) coefficients are reported in the last row.
Appendix I: Patenting in Commitment Equilibrium
Here we sketch our claim that allowing the entrepreneur to commit to a no-patent policy in the second period leads to less patenting. The optimal wage and patent policy under the commitment equilibrium can be described in three ranges of the θ value. First, suppose θ > θ1.
In this case, the entrepreneur cannot retain the scientist whose benefit from setting up a rival is higher than the entrepreneur's maximum loss due to mobility. If ν ≤ δλρ−γρ, the net benefit of patenting to both the entrepreneur and the scientist exceeds the cost, and therefore patenting is optimal. Otherwise, the entrepreneur does not patent.
Second, suppose θ2 < θ ≤ θ1. Without patenting, the establishment of a rival benefits the scientist less than it costs the entrepreneur and thus the entrepreneur offers the scientist the second period wage high enough to make him stay. When the entrepreneur patents the innovation, the scientist leaves to form a rival because patenting causes a new rival's benefit to the scientist to exceed its cost to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur patents if the expected profit when patenting (with the scientist leaving) in the second period exceeds that when not patenting (with him staying). That is, the entrepreneur patents if ν ≤ θ -λρ − (w*− w ) + (δλρ − γρ).
When the scientist stays, the second period wage can be set at any level which is higher than the smallest wage that the scientist would accept to stay; i.e. w1 ≥ θ + w .
Finally, suppose θ ≤ θ2. In this case, the entrepreneur does not patent, and offers the scientist a second period wage that satisfies w1 ≥ max{θ + w , w } to retain the scientist. The entrepreneur's wage and patent policies under the commitment equilibrium are depicted in be better off by minimizing the patenting cost. The scientist is less likely to move in this equilibrium. We can also easily prove that under the commitment equilibrium we retain the implications in the previous propositions.
